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Abstract. The effectiveness of public warning systems (PWS) can be challenged 
by federal structures as the failure of the first nationwide German “Warntag” 
(Warning Day) showed. By designing PWS to address specific challenges of 
federal systems, the effectiveness of public warning might be improved. In this 
paper, we derive design principles for PWS which aim to address these specific 
challenges. Based on a thorough literature review, challenges regarding 
responsibility, coordination, and interoperability, as well as functional and 
technical requirements for PWS in federal systems were identified. By applying 
a design-oriented research approach, 16 design principles in the categories 
strategy and governance, standards and templates, and technology are articulated. 
The research provides guidance for responsible authorities in federal systems for 
the implementation or evaluation of public warning systems. 
Keywords: public warning system, public warning, federalism, design 
principles, design science 
1 Introduction 
In 2020, public warning received public attention in Germany when the first nationwide 
“Warntag” (Warning Day) was declared a failure by the Ministry of Interior [1]. One 
of the reasons was that the warning apps NINA and KATWARN pushed warning 
messages delayed or not at all, as warning messages were accidentally triggered 
simultaneously on the federal, state, and local level [2]. As public warning systems 
(PWS) and administrative and governance structures are directly linked to each other, 
state structures can challenge the effectiveness of PWS [3]. For example, the German 
PWS is regarded as highly influenced by the federal character of the civil protection 
responsibility [3, 4]. Every citizen must be entitled to receive a warning of equal quality 
if they are potentially affected by an emergency. From a federal perspective, this means 
an increased need for guidelines to ensure that the same quality of warning is delivered 
throughout the federal system [5]. 
This paper addresses these challenges of public warning in a federal administrative 
system by the development of design principles for public warning systems in federal 
administrative systems. The design principles serve the purpose of guiding through the 
implementation of a new PWS. To meet the research goal appropriately, this paper 
follows a design-oriented research approach proposed by Österle et al. [6]. 
The following section of this paper introduces the research background and relevant 
concepts regarding public warning, including the means of public warning, challenges 
for public warning in a federal system, and the requirements for public warning. In the 
next section, the paper's overall research design to achieve the research goal is 
explained. Afterward, design principles derived from prioritized requirements are 
presented as the results of the research and applied to the German case. Finally, the 
results are discussed, including the study’s limitations and implications for research and 
practice. 
2 Research Background 
2.1 Public Warning 
Public warning is “the provision of timely and effective information, through identified 
institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid or reduce 
their risk and prepare for effective response” [7]. To obtain relevant information in risk 
situations, four types of communication can be classified [8]: (1) from citizen to 
authorities, (2) among authorities, (3) from authorities to citizens, and (4) among 
citizens. This paper focuses on the third type of communication, which is achieved by 
PWS [8], through which authorities provide the citizens with relevant emergency-
related information as well as suggested actions to be protected in risk situations [8]. 
Means of informing, alerting, and warning the population have changed over the 
years. However, the traditional warning system sirens are still in use since they are 
recognized as a “universal language” for an emergency and therefore make people 
aware of an occurring emergency [9, 10]. However, sirens have limited capabilities to 
provide the population with more information about the emergency and could fail to 
operate due to their outside outdoor location [9]. Through the information era, people 
impose high demands in the information flow about events before acting, as they are 
used to being consistently provided with sufficient information [3]. Established and 
new media, like radios, warning-apps, or TV broadcasts, can warn the population and 
simultaneously advise the necessary action in time [10]. 
Means of informing, alerting, and warning the population have changed over the last 
couple of years. The traditional warning system, a siren is still in usage, since it is 
recognized as a “universal language” for an emergency and therefore makes people 
aware of an occurring emergency [9, 19]. However, the siren is limited in its 
capabilities, as it is not capable of notifying the population with more information about 
the emergency and due to its outside location, could fail to operate [9]. Additionally, 
through the information era, people impose high demands in the information flow about 
events before acting, as they are used to constantly being provided with sufficient 
information [3]. New media, like radios, warning-apps, or TV broadcast can warn the 
population and simultaneously advice the required action in time [10]. 
2.2 Public Warning and Federalism 
The nature of a public warning system is closely related to the administration and 
governance structures of the country in which it is applied [3]. A state’s complex and 
often contradictory social and administrative relationships shape and influence its 
actions and responses to disasters [11]. Therefore, managing risk in multilevel systems 
is strongly influenced by policy decisions and institutions on multiple administrative 
levels. 
As they differ in administrative and governance structures, each federal 
administrative system faces its own administrative and governance challenges, 
influencing the adopted solutions for public warning significantly [3]. In the case of 
multilevel systems, complexity increases, and challenges regarding responsibility [12, 
13], coordination [12, 14, 15] and interoperability [3, 15, 16] occur. In the case of 
multilevel systems, complexity increases. The literature review revealed responsibility 
[12, 13], coordination [12, 14, 15], and interoperability [3, 15, 16] as the main 
challenges of public warning in federal systems.  
Responsibility. In a multilevel system, responsibilities are usually delegated among 
different federal and state departments, and critical conflicts and gaps can occur within 
these relationships [15]. In multilevel systems, clear responsibilities, especially for 
warning system implementation, need to be defined [13]. 
Coordination. In a multilevel system, coordination ensures that all levels of the system 
work together in a synchronized manner. This is one of the most prevailed challenges 
of public warning in multilevel systems and inadequate coordination between different 
levels is a significant barrier for the functioning of warning systems [13].  
Interoperability. Another challenge related to public warning in a federal system is 
interoperability. Barriers to the interoperability of public warning systems are higher 
when civil protection is decentralized [3]. The literature describes different perspectives 
and levels of interoperability. In contrast, some authors address interoperability in 
regards to the need for interoperable communication systems [15], and others stress the 
importance of interoperability of neighboring countries [9] and Europe-wide 
interoperability of public warning and alert systems [17]. 
There are also distinct advantages concerning public warning in federal systems. 
Federal structures and the resulting necessity to involve multiple actors in public 
warning processes can lead to a constructive competition of ideas, and productive 
knowledge exchange among institutions [14]. A positive outcome of complex 
governance networks is that actors from multiple levels are urged to jointly reach 
decisions on parallel activities or coordinative measures, which might facilitate 
common standards in civil protection [14]. 
3 Research Design 
To meet our research goal, we follow the design-oriented research approach by Österle 
et al. [6]. Design-oriented research explicitly focuses on solving problems by 
developing IT artifacts in four phases. In the first phase, Analysis, the research problem 
is identified, and the methods to be applied for solving the problem are planned. In the 
following phase, Design, the actual development of the artifact is conducted, which is 
critically tested in the third phase—the Evaluation. Lastly, the results of the research 
are disseminated during the fourth phase, Diffusion. 
For the Analysis, we made practical and scientific considerations and further 
investigated the areas of public warning and federalism. As a result of this, we 
uncovered several competing characteristics of warning systems and federal structures 
underlining the relevance of our investigations, which finally led to the formulation of 
our research goal. To address this goal, we firstly derived requirements for public 
warning systems in federal systems by conducting a literature review and an expert 
interview.  
The literature review was conducted according to Webster and Watson [18]. The 
literature consisted of relevant articles from the databases Web of Science and Scopus 
between 2010 to 2020. A total number of 21 academic sources were considered relevant 
to the previously introduced problem. Additionally, a manual search of the titles in all 
volumes and issues between 2010 and 2020 of the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management and the Journal of Emergency Management and Homeland Security was 
conducted, which resulted in two additional relevant academic sources. Finally, the 
sources identified in the first two steps were used for backward and forward research, 
which added another five sources to the literature review.  
The literature review resulted in a set of relevant academic sources that covered 
functional as well as technical requirements for PWS in general [18], as well as specific 
requirements that address the previously identified challenges of responsibility, 
coordination, and interoperability of public warning for federal administrative systems. 
Requirements from all sources were synthesized and evaluated regarding their 
applicability to the challenges of federalism. Applicable requirements were categorized 
in line with the following statement by Párraga Niebla [3, p. 231]: “public warning is 
effective if the following conditions are met: 1) the citizens at risk receive, notice, 
understand and trust warning messages on time; 2) the citizens at risk are prepared to 
act, i.e., are sufficiently familiar with warning procedures and trained to act upon”. As 
the latter is not within the scope of PWS, applicable requirements were categorized 
according to the first part of the statement. The statement was chosen as a framework 
as the paper ultimately aims to support the effectiveness of public warning, which is 
what Párraga Niebla [3] refers to. 
To ensure the applicability and completeness of the requirements determined in the 
literature review, we conducted one expert interview with a focus on public warning in 
federal states. The interviewee is employed in the middle management of an agency for 
civil protection in a federal administration. The interview lasted 73 minutes, was 
recorded, and then transcribed. We analyzed the interview according to the specificities 
of public warning systems in federal states, corresponding requirements, and our design 
principles. Together with further insights from documents of other organizations 
involved in civil protection and hazard management, we obtained our final set of 
requirements. Based on these requirements, we proceeded with the development of our 
design principles. Design principles are artifacts that apply to a class of problems and 
go beyond a classical instantiation [19]. An iterative and incremental approach was 
chosen to derive the design principles. The authors took turns in developing first drafts 
and reviewing the other authors’ work. In total, three iterations were carried out until 
the set of principles was finished. The IT artifact was developed argumentatively. 
Consequently, we created our artifact to offer guidelines for introducing or evaluating 
PWS in federal systems.  
The preliminary Evaluation of the design principles was two-fold: First, we 
conducted a feature comparison [20] against the requirements a PWS in federal systems 
should meet. Second, we tested their applicability exemplary for the German case. 
We already started with the Diffusion of our findings with a presentation in front of 
seven academic professionals and a group of 24 students. We are planning to further 
disseminate our work on the 16. Internationale Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik. 
4 Requirements 
4.1 Literature Review 
The literature review revealed applicable requirements in three out of the four 
conditions necessary to ensure effective public warning as referred to in the statement 
by Párraga Niebla, [3], in Section 2.2., namely “receive”, “understand” and “trust”. No 
requirements in the category “notice” were considered relevant to the specific 
challenges. 
Receive. Seven applicable requirements aim to ensure that the population receives 
warning messages distributed by authorities. The first requirement refers to using a 
multi-channel approach in order to reach all people threatened by a hazard in all 
contexts. Several sources concluded that a multi-channel approach increases the 
effectiveness of public warning or is less risky as all channels have limitations [4, 5, 
14, 21–23]. Further supporting arguments insist on the need for (ubiquitous) coverage 
and high penetration of warning technologies [3, 24]. Furthermore, the population 
needs to be warned in different contexts, which cannot be reached by the same warning 
channels [3, 5, 8, 9]. Also, people’s access to one technology (e.g., their mobile phone 
or specific applications) cannot be guaranteed [5, 25]. Brynielsson et al. [26] further 
reason that people’s perceptions of source credibility and trust differ, which is another 
argument for using different channels to make PWS more effective. 
Second, authorities should be able to activate all necessary channels easily and 
without issues [4]. Besides, channels and technologies should be compatible [16, 27]. 
In this context, Párraga Niebla et al. [4] refer to the introduction of the Common 
Alerting Protocol (CAP) as an essential step. Fourth, warnings should be sent based on 
citizens’ current location (geotargeting) [3, 5, 8, 9, 14], in order to “avoid excessive 
panic” [24, p. 154]. Due to this requirement, cell broadcasting might not be an 
appropriate technology for large countries, as cells tend to cover large areas [5]. The 
fifth requirement relates to warning the population in a timely manner, not only but 
also by using appropriate technologies [3, 5, 8, 14, 16, 24, 26, 28]. Lastly, the literature 
stresses the need to use highly available [3], reliable and resilient [3, 5], as well as 
redundant [16] technologies to prevent failures. For federal countries, Aloudat and 
Michael [5] mention the need to establish clear protocols for information dissemination 
to ensure the correctness of the destination of the message which also relates to the 
trust in concept of trust later mentioned in this section. 
Understand. Three distinct requirements aim to ensure that recipients of warning 
messages understand them. Firstly, when formulating and sending alerts, authorities 
should use a targeted approach by considering different needs and capabilities of the 
population, including for example age groups and people with disabilities [8, 27–29]. 
This also includes the support of (configuring) different presentation modes or multi-
media content [3, 8]. Alerts via text messages might, for example, be very beneficial to 
deaf and hearing-impaired [5]. Secondly, alerts should be offered in a language 
understandable by the population, which implies the need to provide information in 
several languages [3, 5, 8]. Lastly, authorities should provide citizens with all or 
sufficient relevant information, including where to find further details [3, 4, 8], in a 
specific [26] and accurate manner [5]. 
Trust. Four applicable requirements were assigned to the category of “trust”. Párraga 
Niebla [3], Preinersdorfer et al. [16], and Green et al. [30]mention the need for PWS to 
include security features. Examples of this can be authentication methods or limiting 
web-based access to PWS to prevent manipulation and cybersecurity threats. Further, 
it needs to be ensured that an “all-clear” message will be sent using the same 
communication channels once the threat is over [14]. Concerning the challenges for 
federal countries, Aloudat and Michael [5] note the necessity to ensure consistent 
quality at all locations, thus also across state borders. Experts interviewed by Aloudat 
and Michael [5] stated that every citizen is entitled to alerts of the same quality, leading 
to the need to specify guidelines by a central (national) agency on what that meant. 
Furthermore, the authors mention the need to establish clear protocols for information 
dissemination to ensure the correctness of the content of the message [5]. 
Further Requirements. Two federalism-specific requirements do not fall into the 
previously introduced categories. Firstly, Aloudat and Michael [5] mention the need for 
a common approach to public warning specified by a central (national) agency. 
Secondly, inadequate coordination is highlighted as the primary barrier for warning 
systems by three authors [3, 12, 13], which supports the call for appropriate governance 
structures to mitigate this issue. Preinersdorfer et al. [16] hereby highlight that 
structures need to ensure that alerts can be sent from different administrative levels 
according to the prevailing disaster management structures. 
4.2 Document Analysis and Expert Interview 
Following the review of academic literature, further documents, for example, those 
published by international organizations, were used to validate the list of requirements. 
Additional sources put a specific emphasis on appropriate governance structures and 
clear responsibilities as well as standardized procedures and protocols to ensure 
effective warning of the population [31–33]. In addition, the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) defines a list of scenarios in which 
citizens need to be reached [34]. It widens the definition of citizens at risk, including 
those “entering the area or in close proximity to the area during the emergency” [34, p. 
9], which specifies the first requirement (see Receive) as derived from academic 
literature. One additional requirement, namely, to ensure appropriate training of 
warning personnel [32], was added to the list. 
Besides, the requirements from the literature were cross-referenced with insight from 
the expert interview. Insights from the interview confirmed four requirements that had 
previously been identified by other sources: The need to use a multi-channel approach 
with technologies that provide attention-calling features, to reach all people at risk in 
all contexts and locations. As stated by the interviewee: “In our opinion there is not just 
one warning channel […] because every warning channel has some advantages and 
disadvantages. The radio is still the most widespread warning multiplier […] the 
disadvantage is that you do not wake up when the radio is switched off - you need 
something to wake people up with”. The interviewee also emphasized the need to 
provide the population with “all clear” messages that “need to be formulated in such a 
way that the citizen understands it”.  
5 Design Principles 
Based on the finalized list of requirements, we developed design principles in the areas 
strategy and governance, standards and templates, and technology. The design 
principles in the category strategy and governance aim for a common and jointly 
developed public warning concept, highlighting essential aspects that have to be 
considered and defined. For example, is it important to define clear responsibilities 
between federal, state, and local authorities to warn the population on time as well as 
with the appropriate means of public warning. However, a lower authority should be 
able to send warning messages to a larger territorial area within the same state if 
necessary. For this, the authority should receive prior approval from a respectively 
higher authority. The design principles in the category standards and templates focus 
on guaranteeing every citizen, no matter in which federal state they are located, the 
same quality of warning. This can be fulfilled by developing templates and offering 
training to responsible authorities. The last feature, technology, focuses on the 
implementation of the previously defined changes as well as the provision of the 
technologies.  
Strategy and Governance. The principles in this category are based on the identified 
requirement to ensure a common approach as well as on establishing appropriate 
governance structures, including a description of responsibilities. A joint concept of 
strategy and governance supports the avoidance of coordination issues during an 
emergency between different levels of authorities and means of public warning. The 
following principles are defined: 
(1) Federal authorities in coordination with state and local authorities work out and 
use a common concept to warn the public in case of occurring emergencies.  
(2) The concept should consider and define scenarios in which citizens need to be 
reached (e.g., at home, at work, outside, in transit, etc.) and assign at least one 
technology to each scenario. At least one technology needs to be used across the entire 
country, while further technologies can be specified individually by each authority. 
(3) The concept should consider and define warning levels as a basis for assigning 
responsibilities as well as the choice of public warning means. For each warning level, 
it needs to be specified which scenarios need to be covered when sending a warning 
message. 
(4) The concept should consider and define clear responsibilities based on warning 
levels and (territorial) administrative responsibilities. In predefined emergencies, 
authorities should be able to warn the population in proximity to but outside their 
jurisdiction. In order to reach out to a larger area, the responsible authority1 should 
receive prior approval from the respective higher administrative level. 
(5) The concept should consider and define whether and when affected2 authorities 
are allowed to change or adapt a message passed on from the authority responsible for 
that disaster.  
(6) The concept should consider and define whether responsibilities for warning 
messages and all-clear signals can change over the course of a disaster. 
Standards and Templates. The design principles listed in the category standards and 
templates address the requirement category “understand”, which considers different 
needs and capabilities of the population when sending alerts (targeted approach). To 
warn the whole country in case of an emergency, it is of high importance that every 
person can understand the message (provide information in several languages). The 
following principles are defined: 
(7) Public warning messages should be based on common standards to ensure equal 
quality and understanding of messages for the entire population and avoid delays 
despite split responsibilities.  
(8) The responsible authorities should jointly agree on standards for each 
technology/ means of warning (e.g. protocols for information dissemination) to ensure 
equal quality of warning in a timely manner.  
(9) The responsible authorities should jointly agree on standards that consider the 
needs and capabilities of the population to avoid exclusion of parts of the population. 
(10) The responsible authorities should jointly agree on standards which define 
templates for warning messages for each means of warning, to provide the same 
information to every citizen despite their source of information (e.g., relevant content, 
specific and accurate phrasing, languages). 
(11) The responsible authorities should jointly agree on standards that define training 
guidelines. They should further ensure joint training and workshops to enable an 
                                                          
1 The responsible authority is understood to be the authority responsible for sending out the initial 
warning message. The administrative level of the authority might depend on the warning level 
of the disaster. 
2 The affected authority is understood to be an authority in (close) proximity of the disaster (but 
outside the jurisdiction/competence area of the responsible agency) which receives the 
warning message and can send it to its citizens. 
exchange of experiences among different levels. Thereby, every person in charge is 
able to use the provided standards and templates in a correct manner. 
Technology. The last category, containing five design principles, addresses the 
formerly defined requirements of the category “receive”. It is important that all citizens 
are able to receive the same warning message using a centrally provided technology, to 
avoid mixed information and late responses to the warning message. The following 
principles are defined: 
(12) A (national) authority should provide basic infrastructure and interfaces for the 
PWS which can be accessed by all authorities involved in public warning. Thereby, it 
should be assured that this infrastructure is redundant and protected against failures.  
(13) Furthermore, country-wide used technologies should be provided centrally 
(e.g., by a national authority or private provider), which allows states and municipalities 
to additionally connect further warning technologies. This provides a way to assure 
highly available, reliable, and resilient technologies are used. 
(14) The technology of the PWS needs to ensure that all relevant scenarios according 
to warning levels are covered (e.g., by choice of at least one technology in that category) 
when sending a warning message. In each relevant scenario, at least the country-wide 
used technology needs to be used, in order to ensure that all people are reached in the 
same scenarios despite their location. 
(15) Lastly, the responsibilities and access rights should be represented in the PWS 
and (16) the PWS should enable to reassign responsibility of a warning message to 
other levels in case of changing responsibilities (e.g., “all-clear” message from 
authority closest to disaster). The means used for updates of all-clear messages should 
not be adaptable over the course of the disaster. 
6 Exemplary Case Application: The German Case 
In Germany, warning and alerting the population is a task shared between the federal 
and state administrations. Whereas the federal administration is responsible for civil 
protection, especially in defense situations, the states are responsible for protecting the 
population in case of most other disasters [35]. For this purpose, the Federal Office of 
Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) operates the Modular Warning System 
(MoWaS), which has been used by federal and state authorities since 2013 [36]. It 
allows the triggering of all connected warning technologies via a central user interface 
[36].  
In order to uncover opportunities to further increase the effectiveness of public 
warning through MoWaS, the design principles were applied to the German case. Each 
principle was individually checked against information collected through the expert 
interview, analysis of available documents, and web research. In case the design 
principles were not fully adhered to, recommendations based on the design principles 
were formulated. In case information was limited due to access restrictions, for 
example, regarding higher warning levels, we focused on the parts of the system we did 
have information about. The opportunities for improvement were summarized in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Opportunities for increasing the effectiveness of MoWaS 
 
It should be noted that the further development of MoWaS is and was the central 
concern of a project carried out jointly by federal and state governments. It aims to 
finish by the end of 2020 and is funded through the Internal Security Fund (ISF) [38]. 
Some of the recommendations, such as connecting the remaining authorities to 
MoWaS, might therefore already being addressed. 
The exemplary application to the German case emphasizes that the proposed design 
principles can be a valid approach to assess a PWS in a federal administrative system. 
Despite not being able to evaluate all parts of the system due to restricted access to 
information, we could still derive recommendations that might be valuable for 
improving the effectiveness of MoWaS. 
7 Discussion and Conclusion 
We have developed a set of design principles in the categories strategy and governance, 
standards and templates, and technology that aim to guide through the implementation 
of a new PWS in federal administrative systems. Natural and human-made disasters 
can affect large areas of an authority’s population. Equally, public warning has become 
more critical as a consequence of increasing and exacerbating numbers of incidents 
over the past years [28]. Even though technological development and digitalization 
have led to an improvement in PWS, administrative and governance structures also play 
an essential role in effective public warning, especially in complex systems as 
federalism [3, 5, 39]. 
# Opportunity for improvement 
1 The involved authorities should agree on a comprehensive warning concept which 
brings together the information identified in different sources and defines clusters of 
technologies (scenarios) as well as the respective, country-wide used technology for 
each scenario. Responsibilities and rights should be clearly defined (including, for 
example, exceptional situations and the right to warn neighboring municipalities). 
The guidelines agreed upon by federal and state governments in 2019 [37] provide 
a starting point to include these design recommendations. 
2 Templates should be created for each means of public warning considering the needs 
and capabilities of the population. The templates should include (only) the relevant 
content and be explicitly phrased and accurately. Templates need to exist in different 
languages. 
3 The remaining authorities relevant for public warning from the different 
administrative levels should be connected to MoWaS. 
4 It should be ensured that the previously defined country-wide used technologies are 
provided centrally for all citizens by public or private organizations, as are, for 
example, NINA or KATWARN. 
5 Changes based on the previous recommendations should be reflected in MoWaS, for 
example through authorities’ (access) rights and the obligation to choose country-
wide used technologies as well as predefined templates for warning messages. 
Warning updates should only be possible using the same warning technologies. 
To achieve the research goal, we conducted a systematic literature review on the 
requirements for public warning in federal administrative systems according to Webster 
and Watson [18], which detected three challenges of public warning in federal systems: 
missing clear responsibilities, lacking coordination, and interoperability. Furthermore, 
general requirements of a PWS, as well as federalism-specific requirements, have been 
identified. These requirements addressed the categories receive, notice, understand, 
trust as well as further requirements outside those categories. Based on the results of 
the literature review, the design principles were developed.  
7.1 Limitation and further research 
Despite basing the research design on proven research approaches, our work is 
subject to limitations that emphasize the need for further research. Firstly, the literature 
review, especially its manual steps, might be subjective to some extent. It could also be 
difficult to distinguish between generally relevant challenges and requirements as well 
as those that were only applicable in the case discussed by the authors of the article in 
question. Further, the literature review revealed only a limited literature basis for 
requirements regarding administrative structures and especially federalism. This fact 
was mitigated by consulting further documents in the following steps of the research. 
Further research should, thus, aim to extend the literature basis in this field. Due to 
the increasing importance of public warning, scholars could, for example, compare the 
effectiveness of different public warning systems considering their academic 
background. Secondly, even though the basic phases for design-oriented IS research as 
proposed by Österle et al. [6] were followed to derive the IT artifact, the design 
principles were not finally evaluated by experts. Future research should aim to increase 
the involvement of experts in the field of PWS in federalism to verify and test the design 
principles, for example through focus groups. As a next step, research could test the 
design principles together with experts to investigate and improve its practical 
applicability. 
Furthermore, part of the information regarding public warning in Germany is 
classified, which might have influenced the results of the demonstration. We are also 
not the intended addressees of the artifact. As we used only one case for demonstrating 
the artifact, we chose a case in which public warning is substantially influenced by the 
structures of the federal system [3]. This implies that it might indeed be strongly 
affected by the discovered challenges pose a good example for other cases. Scholars 
could now investigate the applicability of our design principles in other federal 
administrative systems, such as Belgium or Australia. Lastly, due to scope, we decided 
to apply only one iteration of Österle et al.’s [6] method. The decision to leave 
improvements of the artifact to the following projects, for example, due to the nature 
of research, is recognized as legitimate [40]. Even though further iterations might 
improve the artifact, it already provides a starting point for further research. It provides 
value to both theory and practice. Other researchers can for example use the artifact as 
groundwork and contribute to improving it with their own knowledge and experiences. 
Most importantly, however, it should be kept in mind that, even though the focus of 
our research was solely on PWS, an effective PWS does not necessarily directly lead 
to an effective public warning. Citizens need to be appropriately prepared, for example, 
by being trained to act upon warning messages [3]. Therefore, future research should 
extend the design principles considering the preparation of citizens. 
7.2 Theoretical and practical implications 
Despite its limitations, we identified key implications for theory and practice which 
emerge from our research. Firstly, the literature review contributes to the closure of the 
identified research gap regarding effective PWS and federalism and highlighted the 
difference in the maturity of the research fields of general public warning (systems) and 
public warning in federalism. Secondly, the design principles provide a starting point 
for national governments and practitioners in responsible agencies to work with. They 
can be used as a basis for discussions with involved parties and draw attention to factors 
that are important for effective public warning. A validated set of design principles will 
eventually enable federal governments to review their overall warning systems and 
discover potentials for improvement. This is especially important considering a 
European Union directive that commits member states to have mobile number-based 
PWS (or equivalent regarding its effectiveness) in place by 21 June 2022 [41]. While it 
influences the choice of warning technologies included in a multi-channel approach for 
public warning, it also generally implies the necessity for a review of existing PWS and 
used technologies. Thirdly, not only federal governments can benefit from the results 
of this paper. As stated by Gregor and Hevner, an “artifact that is presented with a 
higher level degree of abstraction can be generalized to other situations” [19, p. 352]. 
The design principles were kept on a reasonably abstract level; thus, any national 
government can use an adapted version of the model as guidance for a review of its 
PWS. An essential step of the process was to gather overall requirements for effective 
PWS, which can be used as a basis to design an improved system. Lastly, irrespective 
of the administrative level, state or local governments can refer to the design principles 
to drive bottom-up change, which is especially important as they are close to the citizens 
and might be the first to sense when changes in an existing system become necessary. 
7.3 Conclusion 
All in all, the study contributes to filling a research gap, as well as enabling 
governments to identify federal specific areas of improvement in their existing PWS or 
guide the introduction of PWS in federal systems. Eventually, this way the use of our 
design principles can lead to a more effective public warning system. This might in turn 
positively influence the trust of the public in the warning system as well as the 
awareness of measures in case of disasters. In the case of Germany, a more effective 
public warning system might lead to a more positive connotation of the subject and a 
higher acceptance during the next “Warntag” (Warning Day). 
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